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Abstract
This paper seeks to gain insights on the relationship between growth and unemployment
when considering heterogeneous agents in terms of skills. We allow for the possibility of train-
ing for unskilled employed workers and for the possibility of human capital depreciation for
skilled unemployed workers. These features are introduced in an endogenous job destruction
framework µ a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). We show that, when growth accelerates,
a larger share of unskilled workers gets trained, increasing the incentives of ¯rms to update
the job-speci¯c technology, rather than destroying it. The positive impact of growth on the
employment rate is then magni¯ed and the predicting ability of the model to reproduce the
sensibility of employment with respect to growth too. When calibrated, the model manages
to reproduce the aggregate capitalization e®ect estimated on the basis of OECD data. Fur-
thermore, whereas for skilled and unskilled workers getting trained growth yields a reduction
in the unemployment rates, for unskilled workers not getting trained growth fosters a rise in
the unemployment rates.
Keywords: TFP growth, unemployment, training, human capital depreciation, capital-
ization, creative destruction e®ect
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11 Introduction
Recent literature on the relationship between growth and employment does not manage to
reproduce the elasticity of employment with respect to growth. This paper shows that, by
introducing the possibility of training and human capital depreciation in a vintage framework
a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), we greatly improve the predicting ability of the model
to reproduce the sensibility of employment with respect to growth. The intuition behind this
result is very simple: when growth accelerates, the opportunity cost of the training investment
for workers is lower, shifting the human capital distribution to the right since more people get
trained. This tends to increase the incentives of ¯rms to update the job-speci¯c technology.
Therefore training magni¯es the impact of growth on the employment rate.
The relationship between growth and employment has often been claimed to be ambiguous.
Indeed, when growth accelerates, two contradictory e®ects arise. On the one hand, as Pis-
sarides (1990) claims, an acceleration of growth improves the employment rate, because growth
increases \freely" the expected pro¯ts and then provides incentives to open new jobs (the cap-
italization e®ect). On the other hand, Aghion and Howitt (1994) argue that growth fosters
a \creative destruction" process inducing more job destruction and less job creation, yielding
higher unemployment rates (creative destruction e®ect). Even if, theoretically the relationship
seems ambiguous at the empirical level, the capitalization e®ect clearly overcomes the creative
destruction e®ect (see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) or Tripier
(2007)), fostering a positive relationship between growth and employment.
Recent theoretical works on the subject have tried to mimic this empirical ¯nding. Pissarides
and Vallanti (2007) present a vintage model a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) with a repre-
sentative agent and underline the di±culty to reproduce the estimated size of the capitalization
e®ect over employment. Using a panel of OCDE countries, Langot and Moreno-Galbis (2008)
estimate the impact of growth on the employment rate of young and old workers. They ¯nd
that the capitalization e®ect dominates the creative destruction one in the young workers' case
whereas for old workers, the creative destruction e®ect is dominant. Nevertheless, using a stan-
dard calibration, they do not manage to reproduce the estimated elasticities.
Previous studies based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), seem then to miss an important
aspect of the functioning of labor market. In all cases technological progress is embodied, so that
all jobs are created at the technological frontier. However, once created, their productivity re-
mains constant. Because wages increase at the same pace as the technological frontier, positions
2are decreasingly pro¯table. The ¯rm can then decide to update the technology associated with
a job or wait until the job becomes non pro¯table and destroy it. One of the main drawbacks
of this traditional framework is that workers are not allowed to react when their positions loose
pro¯tability. A more realistic framework, should allow them to search on the job or to train
themselves so as to improve their relative productivity. Michaud (2007) already shows that
the predicting ability of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) model is considerably improved
when introducing on the job search1. An alternative approach proposed in our paper consists
in introducing human capital investment µ a la Ljunqvist and Sargent (2008)2 in a vintage model
a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998).
By introducing the opportunity of training and the risk of human capital depreciation during
the unemployment spell, our theoretical framework aims at increasing the probability that the
expected pro¯ts of the ¯rm net of renovation costs increase with growth (which will favor a
capitalization e®ect). Training choices are highly dependent on the growth rate: an acceleration
in growth decreases the opportunity cost of training, leading more workers to train and shifting
then the human capital distribution to the right. Finally, note that the possibility of human
capital depreciation during unemployment spells of skilled workers as well as the possibility for
unskilled workers getting trained to become skilled, yields both skilled workers and unskilled
workers getting trained to accept a lower wage. Firms' pro¯ts are then increased and the optimal
destruction horizon is likely to be delayed, favoring technological updating. Both training and
human capital depreciation tend to increase the positive impact of growth on the employment
rate. The contribution of this paper consists then in proposing two illustrative mechanisms,
training of workers and human capital depreciation, which should magnify the importance of
the capitalization e®ect in a growth context.
We consider a one job-one ¯rm vintage model µ a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) where wages
are posted by ¯rms and where we distinguish between the vintage of the machines and the
human capital level of workers. Firms decide about the optimal destruction or renovation horizon
associated to a machine-position. Workers may be skilled (high-productivity) or unskilled (low-
productivity). Unskilled workers must decide if it is in their interest to train themselves. Those
1The main problem with this approach comes from the wage bargaining problem. Indeed, Shimer (2005b)
shows that the standard solution of the wage bargaining process is not robust to the introduction of the on-the-
job search assumption.
2Low-productivity workers are allowed to train themselves and skilled unemployed workers may su®er human
capital depreciation.
3that get trained pro¯t from an increased human capital in case of technological updating. On the
other hand, unemployed skilled workers see their human capital depreciated with probability
¼. We claim, that both mechanisms improve the model's ability to reproduce the impact of
growth on employment estimated by Pissarides and Vallanti (2007). According to these authors
a one percentage point increase in the growth rate should increase employment by 1.2 to 1.5
percentage points. However, in their paper, Pissarides and Vallanti are obliged to make the
unrealistic assumption that all technological progress is disembodied and that r + ± = 0:05 in
order to be able to reproduce this semielasticity of growth on the employment rate.
Our numerical simulations show that, when using a standard calibration, an increase of one
percentage point in the growth rate, yields a reduction of one percentage point in the aggregate
unemployment rate. Moreover, whereas skilled and unskilled workers getting trained bene¯t
from a reduction in their unemployment rates (capitalization e®ect) by 1.3 percentage points,
unskilled workers not getting trained su®er from an increase in their unemployment rates.
Next section presents the main assumptions of the model. Section 3 describes the agents'
behavior as well as the wage bargaining process. The equilibrium of the model is computed in
section 4. Section 5 presents the numerical simulations and section 6 concludes.
2 The model's assumptions
We build a matching model based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) where the economy is
populated by a continuum of ¯rms and workers. Each ¯rm employs only one worker. Human
capital adopts then two values h 2 [h;h]. Low skilled employed workers may decide to train
themselves by paying a cost equal to ¾, which varies among unskilled workers. Heterogeneity
among workers is represented by the distribution G(¾), over the support [¾;¾]. We will determine
a critical cost level e ¾ below which unskilled workers decide to train themselves and above which
unskilled workers do not get trained. On the other hand, unemployed skilled workers may
become unskilled with probability ¼. We will denote X(h;¾) all variables referring to skilled
workers and X(h;¾) those referring to unskilled.
The productivity level of each worker is linked to their quali¯cation, so that high skilled workers'
productivity is larger than that of low skilled. We distinguish between the human capital level
of the worker and the vintage of the technology she works with. Firms decide whether to update
or not the vintage of the technology, whereas workers decide whether to train themselves or not
4(this only applies to unskilled workers).
At each moment of time a mass u(h;¾) for h = h;h of unemployed workers and a mass v(h)





u(h;¾)dG(¾). Firms do not direct their open vacancy to a particular skill
segment. Jobs and workers meet pairwise at a Poisson rate M(u;v(h;¾)). This function is
assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, exhibiting constant returns to scale. Furthermore
it satis¯es the Inada conditions and M(0;v(h;¾)) = M(u;0) = 0.
Under these assumptions and knowing that M(u;v(h;¾)) represents the number of matches per
unit of time, we can represent the probability of ¯lling a vacancy as q(µ(h;¾)) = M(u;v(h;¾))=v(h;¾) =
M(u;v(h))=µ(h). Equivalently, the probability of ¯nding a job is given by p(µ(h;¾)) = M(u;v(h;¾))=u =
M(µ(h;¾);1). The probability of ¯lling a vacancy with a high skilled worker will be given by
q(µ(h;¾))
u(h;¾)
u , with an unskilled not getting trained by q(µ(h;¾))
u(h;¾>~ ¾)
u and with an unskilled
getting trained by q(µ(h;¾))
u(h;¾<~ ¾)
u .
New jobs embody the most advanced known technology (the latest vintage). However, once
created, their productivity remains constant for the rest of their life. Job creation commits the
¯rm to the technology available at that date. A ¯rm without a worker advertises a job vacancy
at a cost p(t)c per period, where p(t) = egt is a common growth factor and g is the rate of
productivity growth at the technological frontier (creation costs must grow at rate g to ensure the
existence of a steady state with balanced growth). Across newly created jobs, match productivity
thus grows at the exogenous rate g = _ p(t)=p(t) (new jobs always embody the most advanced
known technology). Once the job is created at date ¿ its associated technology, p(¿)x(h) for
h = h;h does not change. The worker's productivity x(h) may be modi¯ed in the unskilled
workers' case if the worker decides to train herself. The opportunity cost of unemployment
is represented by p(t)b(h) for h = h;h. Because the outside option of employment increases
in response to growth whereas the job's productivity remains constant (even in the unskilled
worker's case, once their training is over and they have become skilled, their productivity does
not longer change), the surplus associated with a match is decreasing over time.
Once the job is created two situations may arise. First, the ¯rm can continue to produce with
the same technology embodied in the job at the creation date. Secondly, the ¯rm may decide
to pay a ¯xed renovation cost to update the technology and continue producing with the same
worker. Note though, that when employing an unskilled worker getting trained, a technological
updating is also associated with a human capital increase.
5The ¯rm chooses optimally the scrapping and the renovation horizon associated with a given
position. We denote as TR(h), TR(h;¾) and TR(hn) the optimal implementation horizon for
skilled workers, unskilled workers getting trained and unskilled workers not getting trained,
respectively. Note that training introduces an heterogeneity among labor market earnings of
workers and then between the optimal renovation horizons. Similarly, we denote as T(h), T(h)
and T(hn) the corresponding scrapping horizon for the same workers, where T(h) = T(hn) since,
in the absence of renovation, there is no training.
If the optimal scrapping time is above the optimal implementation time, the ¯rm decides to
update the technology rather than destroying it. Otherwise, if the scrapping horizon is below
the renovation horizon, ¯rms choose to destroy the job. To keep our representation as close as
possible to Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) we will also assume that jobs might be destroyed
by an exogenous shock with probability ±.
3 The agents' behavior
An open vacancy can remain empty or be ¯lled and become productive. The associated asset
value for each of these situations is represented by V (t) if the vacancy is empty at the current
date t. J(¿;t;h;¾) for h = h;h stands for the value of an existing job at date t which was
created at time ¿. Similarly, the value of employment in a job at date t which was created at
time ¿ is represented by W(¿;t;h;¾) for h = h;h, whereas the value of unemployment at date t
is given by U(t;h;¾). We consider the case where the optimal renovation time associated with
a job occupied by a high skilled worker is below the optimal renovation time of a job occupied
by a low-skilled worker.
3.1 Workers
The machine's or technology characteristics are summarized by the actual creation time, ¿, and
the current time, t. The worker's characteristics are summarized by the vector fh;¾g, where
h = h;h stands for the human capital level and ¾ corresponds to the cost borne by a worker
that wants to become skilled. Because ¾ varies across individuals, we may also interpret it as
the inherent ability of each individual.
63.1.1 Employed workers
The skilled worker does not train, since she already has the top human capital level3.
The asset value of an employed skilled worker:
rW(¿;t;h;¾) = ws(¿;t;h;¾)h ¡ ±(W(¿;t;h;¾) ¡ U(t;h;¾)) + _ W(¿;t;h;¾) (1)
where ws(¿;t;h;¾) stands for the wage earned at date t by a skilled worker operating a machine
created at ¿ and ± corresponds to the exogenous job destruction rate.
For the unskilled worker, the situation is somewhat di®erent. In order to improve her human
capital (become skilled) in case of technological updating, the worker can decide to get trained.
Depending on her inherent ability, this training may become more or less expensive. We show
that there exist a threshold value e ¾ such that if ¾ < e ¾ the cost of training is lower than the
expected returns of getting trained, so that the worker trains. Conversely, for very low ability
levels, the training cost is too high (¾ > e ¾) and it is not in the interest of the worker to get
trained.
We ¯rst consider the asset value associated with an unskilled employed worker getting trained
(¾ < e ¾). We assume that the worker will only be able to bene¯t from an increase in his human









r + ± ¡ g
!
[w(h;¾) ¡ ¾ + ±U(h;¾)] + e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
W(h;¾)
=
w(h;¾) ¡ ¾ + ±U(h;¾)
r + ± ¡ g
+
e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1 ¡ e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h) [W(h;¾) ¡ W(h;¾)] (2)
where ¿ = t = 0, W(t;t;h;¾) ´ p(t)W(h;¾), W(t;t;h;¾) ´ p(t)W(h;¾) and U(t;h;¾) ´
p(t)U(h;¾).





[W(h;¾) ¡ W(h;¾)] (3)
,
~ ¾
r + ± ¡ g
=
e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1 ¡ e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)[W(h;¾) ¡ W(h;¾)]
When the inherent ability of the worker is so low that the training cost ¾ overcomes e ¾ the
unskilled worker does not get trained. In this case, the asset value of the unskilled worker
3Even if the cost of training, ¾, does not play any role, we leave it in the notation because any skilled worker
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r + ± ¡ g
(6)
3.1.2 Unemployed workers
An unemployed worker receives a °ow of earnings4 p(t)bh for h = h;h including unemployment
bene¯ts, leisure, domestic productivity, etc... and increasing with the technology frontier. A
skilled job seeker comes into contact with a vacant slot at rate p(µ) = µq(µ) and becomes
unskilled with probability ¼.
The associated asset value is given by:
rU(t;h;¾) = p(t)bh + µq(µ)[W(t;t;h;¾) ¡ U(t;h;¾)]
¡¼[U(t;h;¾) ¡ U(t;h;¾)] + _ U(t;h;¾) (7)
Unskilled job seekers enter into contact with a vacancy at rate p(µ) = µq(µ). The asset value of
unemployment associated to unskilled workers is given by:
rU(t;h;¾) = p(t)bh + µq(µ)[W(t;t;h;¾) ¡ U(t;h;¾)]
+ _ U(t;h;¾) (8)
3.2 The wages
In the aim of simplicity the analysis presented along the lines of this paper considers the wage
posting case5, that is, workers have a bargaining power equal to zero and so, the asset value of
unemployment equals the asset value of employment (W(¿;t;h;¾) = U(t;h;¾)). Furthermore,
according to Pissarides and Vallanti (2007), the rigid wage representation improves the elasticity
of the employment rate with respect to the TFP growth rate.
4We impose unemployment bene¯ts to be increasing in human capital so as to ensure a positive training e®ort
even under the assumption of wage posting.
5The alternative hypothesis of bargained wages in the presence of interactions between the skilled and the
unskilled segment implies that negotiated wages depend on the relationship between the labor market tightness
of the two segments, which rends the analytical resolution of the model too complex.





r + ¼ ¡ g
¸
8¾ ) w(¿;t;h;¾)h = w(¿;t;h)h (9)
This wage does not depend on the speci¯c worker ability ¾ since it is independent from the
worker's productivity. This implies that the wage earned in the skilled segment is the same for
all workers.
A skilled worker is ready to accept a wage lower than her own unemployment bene¯t since she
interiorizes the fact that if she becomes unemployed her human capital may depreciate and her
unemployment bene¯t may then fall. Skilled wages decrease then with the probability ¼ of
human capital depreciation in case of unemployment. The higher the divergence between the
unemployment bene¯t perceived by skilled and unskilled unemployed workers or, equivalently,
the higher the divergence between human capital levels, the lower the wage skilled workers are
ready to accept, since in case of unemployment the risk of becoming unskilled includes also the
risk of su®ering a sharp decrease in unemployment bene¯ts.
Unskilled workers getting trained become skilled when the ¯rm updates a technology. In the
wage posting case we deduce, using the asset value of an employed worker that:
U(h;¾) =
w(h;¾) ¡ ¾ + ±U(h;¾)
r + ± ¡ g
+
e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1 ¡ e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h) [U(h;¾) ¡ U(h;¾)] (10)






r + ¼ ¡ g
which implies:
U(h;¾) ¡ U(h;¾) =
b(h ¡ h)
r + ¼ ¡ g
Replacing these expressions in (10), we deduce the reservation wage associated to unskilled
getting trained:






r + ¼ ¡ g
(11)
The wage an unskilled worker is ready to accept increases with his own unemployment bene¯t
as well as with the cost of getting trained in order to become skilled (the worker transfers this
cost to the ¯rm during the bargaining process). The larger the di®erential between the skilled
and the unskilled unemployment bene¯ts, the lower the wage the worker will be ready to accept
since if she gets a job she will be able to train herself and become skilled. Then, in case of
9loosing the job she will get a larger unemployment bene¯t. On the other hand, if the probability
of human capital depreciation ¼ is high, the interest of being skilled is reduced and therefore
the unskilled worker asks for a higher wage.
The wage6 earned by unskilled workers getting trained depends on ¾, implying that there is a
continuum of wages varying with ¾. The instantaneous pro¯t obtained by the ¯rm varies hence
with the ¾ associated with the worker they hire.
When the unskilled worker does not get trained the wage equals:
w(¿;t;h;¾)h = p(t)bh 8¾ ) w(¿;t;h;¾)h = w(¿;t;h)h (12)
To keep a coherent notation, we leave ¾ in the previous expression. Note though that, for
workers not getting trained, i.e: having a ¾ > e ¾, the training cost does not a®ect wages and so
the labor market is not segmented: productivity and wages are homogenous.
3.3 The decision to train
The training e®ort is positive if the training cost is lower or equal to the returns from training.










r + ± ¡ g
r + ¼ ¡ g
b(h ¡ h) (13)
As far as ¾ · ~ ¾, it is always in the interest of the worker to get trained. If ¾ > ~ ¾, the worker
never gets trained. If she ever got trained she would ask for a wage above b, then no ¯rm will
hire her. Firms prefer to hire higher ability workers that ask for a lower wage.
6In order to insure the positivity of wages for all workers having a training cost below ~ ¾ some constraints must
be imposed on the parameters. Let's set wages to zero in expression (11):







r + ¼ ¡ g
Then, there exist a lower value of ¾, denoted ¾ such that
¾ = ¡bh +
r + ± ¡ g







The adopted calibration in the numerical simulations will be such that the minimum ¾ of the distribution will be
above ¾.
10We suppose a continuum of ¾ with a distribution function G(¾). Given the critical e ¾, the mass
of trained workers is then given by G(e ¾), whereas the number of unskilled worker who do not
choose to train is given by 1 ¡ G(e ¾). We will then have a group of workers that gets trained
and a group of workers that does not train. Congestion problems guarantee that there will be
posted vacancies for all ability levels.
3.4 Firms
3.4.1 Vacancies
When the ¯rm opens a vacancy at date t it bears a cost p(t)c, whatever the type of worker,
skilled or unskilled, required to ¯ll the vacancy. On the other hand, there is a probability
q(µ(h;¾))
u(h;¾)
u that the vacancy gets ¯lled with a ¾-type skilled worker, q(µ(h;¾))
u(h;¾>~ ¾)
u with
a ¾-type unskilled not getting trained and q(µ(h;¾))
u(h;¾<~ ¾)
u with a ¾-type unskilled getting
trained.
We suppose then undirected search, that is, when the ¯rm posts a vacancy it does not know
what type of worker will ¯ll the vacancy. Once the contact takes place, the ¯rm will be able to
recognize the type of worker.
The asset value of an empty vacancy is given by:







































J(t;t;h;¾)dG(¾) ´ J (15)
The asset value at date t of a job ¯lled at date ¿ varies depending on whether the job is ¯lled by
a skilled or an unskilled worker. In the former case, if at date ¿ the worker ¯lling the vacancy
is an unskilled with ¾ < e ¾, the ¯rm interiorizes the fact that when updating the technology the
worker will also bene¯t from a human capital increase. Furthermore, wages paid by the ¯rm
vary depending on the type of worker, since not all of them bear a training cost.
113.4.2 Jobs occupied by skilled workers
Let us start with the expected °ow of pro¯ts when the vacancy is ¯lled by a skilled worker. The
¯rm chooses the optimal updating time so as to maximize the expected °ow of pro¯ts taking






+e¡(r+±)(¿+TR(h)¡t)[J(¿ + TR(h);¿ + TR(h);h) ¡ p(¿ + TR(h))I(h;¾)](16)
We assume that the productivity of a skilled worker depends inversely on his training e®ort ¾
(which is actually linked to the worker's ability) implying that x = x(¾) with x0(¾) < 0. The
updating time varies then with ¾.
Property 1 The equilibrium optimal renovation date of a job occupied by a skilled
worker depends on the worker's training e®ort ¾ via the productivity x(¾) and via the
implementation cost, which is exogenously ¯xed. The renovation horizon increases
with the updating cost (I) and decreases with the growth rate of technical progress
(g).
Proof: Given a stationary time path for future labor market tightness, we conjecture that the
value of a new job is proportional to productivity on the technology frontier, i.e. J(t;t;h;¾) =










+e¡(r+±¡g)(TR(h))[J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)] (17)
The optimal renovation time is determined by maximizing (17), which leads to the FOC:
w(h) =
x(¾)h
egTR(h) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)) (18)
Replacing w(h;¾) = [bh ¡ ¼
(bh¡bh)




e¡(r+±)s(1 ¡ eg(s¡TR(h)))ds (19)
¥
12Equation (19) determines TR(h), which can then be replaced in (17) so as to ¯nd the optimal
value of J(h;¾).
In the aim of simplicity, we assume that renovation is always the preferred option for jobs
occupied by skilled workers. This is guaranteed if I(h;¾) ! 0. In this case, equation (19) implies




r + ± ¡ g
where the impact of an acceleration in growth is unambiguously positive (capitalization e®ect).
3.4.3 Job occupied by an unskilled worker getting trained
Similarly, the ¯rm chooses the optimal updating time so as to maximize the expected °ow of






+e¡(r+±)(¿+TR(h)¡t)[J(¿ + TR(h);¿ + TR(h);h;¾) ¡ p(¿ + TR(h))I(h;¾)] (20)
In this case, the wage is a function of the speci¯c worker ability (¾). We then have a ¾-speci¯c
optimal updating time.
Property 2a The equilibrium optimal renovation date of a job occupied by an
unskilled worker getting trained depends on his training e®ort ¾ via the wage, via the
potential productivity that will be obtained in the skilled position and via the imple-
mentation cost, which is exogenously given. The optimal renovation time increases
with the updating cost (I), decreases with the growth rate of technical progress (g)
and may increase or decrease with the training cost7, (¾).
Proof: Given a stationary time path for future labor market tightness, we conjecture J(t;t;h;¾) =









The FOC associated with the optimal renovation date is
w(h;¾) =
xh
egTR(h) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)) (22)
7The adopted calibration ensures that the renovation horizon increases with the training cost.
133.4.4 Job occupied by an unskilled worker not getting trained
If the job is ¯lled by an unskilled worker not getting trained the expected °ow of pro¯ts maxi-






+e¡(r+±)(¿+TR(hn)¡t)[J(¿ + TR(hn);¿ + TR(hn);h;¾) ¡ p(¿ + TR(hn))I(h;¾)] (23)
The optimal updating time is homogenous among this type of workers because neither their
wages nor their productivity are ¾-speci¯c.
Property 2b The equilibrium optimal renovation date of a job occupied by an
unskilled worker not getting trained depends on his training e®ort only via the imple-
mentation cost, which is exogenously given. The optimal renovation time increases
with the updating cost (I) and decreases with the growth rate of technical progress
(g).
Proof: Again, given a stationary time path for future labor market tightness, we conjecture
that the value of a new job is proportional to productivity on the technology frontier, i.e.







[J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)] (24)
The FOC is given by:
w(h) =
xh
egTR(hn) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)) (25)




e¡(r+±)s(1 ¡ eg(s¡TR(hn))) (26)
¥
144 Equilibrium
4.1 De¯nition of the equilibrium
De¯nition 1 The equilibrium of the economy is characterized by:
Segmentation

















r + ¼ ¡ g
¸
(29)
Unskilled labor segment with training: for ¾ · e ¾:
w(h;¾) =
xh
egTR(h) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)) (30)











e¡(r+±)s[xh ¡ egsw(h;¾)]ds + e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
[J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)] (32)
Unskilled labor segment without training: 8¾ > e ¾:
w(h) =
xh
egTR(hn) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h) ¡ I(h;¾)) (33)




e¡(r+±)s[xh ¡ egsw(h)]ds + e¡(r+±¡g)TR(hn)














4.2 The interaction between renovation, training decisions and growth
We start this section analyzing the interaction between the training decision (a worker's choice)
and the renovation decision (a ¯rm's choice). We then focus on the behavior of the marginal
unskilled worker getting trained, the e ¾-type worker.
Proposition 2: There is a unique pair (TR(h);e ¾) satisfying simultaneously the
training choices and the optimal renovation date.




egTR(h;~ ¾) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;e ¾) ¡ I(h;e ¾))
e ¾ = (r + ± ¡ g)
Ã
e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h;~ ¾)
1 ¡ e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h;~ ¾)
!
b(h ¡ h)
r + ¼ ¡ g
In the ¯rst equation, the left hand-side corresponds to the wage of the e ¾-worker, whereas the
right hand-side corresponds to the optimal renovation date. The higher the value of ~ ¾ the lower
the productivity if the worker becomes skilled (since x0(¾) < 0) and then the lower the value of
the ¯lled vacancy, J(h;e ¾). This yields a higher renovation horizon. That is, the right hand side
establishes a positive relationship between ~ ¾ and TR(h).







0). Then, we deduce that there is a unique intersection point (TR(h);e ¾) satisfying simultaneously
these two equations ¥
With ~ ¾ determined, the cost level ¾ of workers getting trained is not longer an unknown, since
it is in the interest of all workers with a ¾ included in the interval [0; ~ ¾] to get trained, where
¾ is supposed to be distributed between 0 and ¾. Then, it is enough to replace (11) in (22) in
order to ¯nd the optimal renovation horizon for each ¾.
4.2.1 The relationship between the renovation horizon and training decision, (TR(h); ~ ¾)
The optimal renovation horizon for ¯rms varies depending on whether the unskilled worker gets
trained or not. Does training advance or delay renovation? Let's compare the two FOC allowing
to compute the renovation horizons for the last unskilled worker getting trained (TR(h;~ ¾)) and
for unskilled workers not getting trained (TR(hn)):
bh =
xh
egTR(hn) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)) for ¾ > ~ ¾
bh =
xh
egTR(h) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;e ¾) ¡ I(h;e ¾)) for ¾ = ~ ¾
The last worker getting trained, the ~ ¾-worker, receives the same wage as unskilled workers not
getting trained. However, for I(h;¾) = I 8¾, since J(h;e ¾) > J(h;¾ > ~ ¾), it is easy to verify
that TR(h;~ ¾) < TR(hn). That is, the last trained unskilled worker is renovated before any of the
unskilled worker not getting trained.
What about the relationship between the renovation horizon of workers with ¾ < ~ ¾ and ¾ > ~ ¾?
16Corollary: For all ¾ · ~ ¾ the renovation horizon will necessarily be smaller for any
of the workers getting trained than for workers not getting trained.
Proof: Let's start by simply replacing equation (22) in expression (21), which yields:
I(h;¾ < ~ ¾) = J(h;¾ < ~ ¾) ¡ J(h;¾ < ~ ¾) + xh
Z TR(h)
0
e¡(r+±)s(1 ¡ eg(s¡TR(h))) (37)
where the last term of the previous expression corresponds to equation (26) but with a di®erent
renovation horizon. Because we assume I(h;¾ < ~ ¾) = I(h;¾ > ~ ¾) and J(h;¾ < ~ ¾) > J(h;¾ > ~ ¾)
8 the integral term
R TR(h)
0 e¡(r+±)s(1¡eg(s¡TR(h))) must necessary have an upper limit below the
one of equation (26), i.e.
R TR(hn)
0 e¡(r+±)s(1 ¡ eg(s¡TR(hn))), that is TR(h) must necessarily be
below TR(hn).¥
Because ¯rms renovate faster jobs occupied by unskilled getting trained than jobs occupied by
unskilled not getting trained, the larger the share of workers getting trained in an economy, the
more likely the capitalization e®ect will dominate when growth accelerates.
4.2.2 The relationship between growth and training decision, (g; ~ ¾)
Without training, the relationship between employment and growth is less positive because
capitalization occurs only in skilled positions where I(h;¾) = 0. At the opposite, when training
is possible, a rise in the growth rate leads workers to expect higher returns from the training
decision. Then, the positive impact on the employment rate associated with the acceleration of
the growth rate is magni¯ed by a composition e®ect: a larger share of workers has the incentive
to train and access to jobs where the capitalization e®ect exists.
Proposition 3: As far as ± ¸ ¼ an acceleration in the growth rate increases the
share of unskilled workers getting trained.
8Note that, the minimum instantaneous pro¯t obtained in a job occupied by a ~ ¾-worker equals h(x¡b) which
is below the pro¯t associated with a high skilled position, h(x(~ ¾)¡b)+¼
b(h¡h)
r+¼¡g as far as productivity di®erentials
compensate unemployment bene¯t di®erentials, which will be the case if x(~ ¾) ¸ x (the adopted calibration ensures
that this inequality is always satis¯ed). In the same way, the maximum pro¯t associated with the ¾ = 0-worker






r+¼¡g. When comparing to the pro¯t associated with a high
skilled position, h(x(~ ¾) ¡ b) + ¼
b(h¡h)
r+¼¡g, we realize that, since h(x ¡ b) < h(x(~ ¾) ¡ b), in order to ensure that the
instantaneous pro¯t associated with a skilled worker is larger than that of the most pro¯table low-skilled worker,
it is enough to have ¼ > (r + ± ¡ g)
e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1¡e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h) . This inequality is likely to be satis¯ed since the renovation
horizon is very small for ¾ = 0. This ensures then that J(h;¾ < ~ ¾) > J(h;¾ < ~ ¾), 8¾²[0; ~ ¾].
17Proof: We proceed by steps. First, because bh =
xh
egTR(h) ¡ (r + ± ¡ g)(J(h;e ¾) ¡ I(h;e ¾)) is
positive sloped in the (TR(h);e ¾) space and since ~ ¾ = e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1¡e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
r+±¡g
r+¼¡gb(h ¡ h) is negative
sloped in the (TR(h);e ¾) space, we know that there exists a unique intersection point between
both lines, determining the equilibrium ~ ¾. Second, we use a static comparative analysis to
determine the impact of an acceleration of growth in each of these locus. Let's start with
bh =
xh






= ¡TR(h) ¡ I < 0
so that the locus shifts downwards.
Concerning ~ ¾ = e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1¡e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
r+±¡g
r+¼¡gb(h¡h), for a given TR(h) an acceleration of growth yields











b(h ¡ h)(r + ± ¡ g)
(r + ¼ ¡ g)
e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
1 ¡ e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h) TR(h) > 0 for ± > ¼
Unambiguously, the share of workers getting trained (determined by ~ ¾) increases then when
growth accelerates. The impact on the renovation horizon depends on the relationship between
the productivity in the skilled segment and the value of ¾. More precisely, combining the
total di®erentials with respect to g of bh =
xh












b(h ¡ h)(r + ± ¡ g)2e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)






(TR(h) + I(h;e ¾)) + b(h ¡ h)
Ã
± ¡ ¼






b(h ¡ h)(r + ± ¡ g)e¡(r+±¡g)TR(h)
(r + ¼ ¡ g)(1 ¡ e(r+±¡g)TR(h))
The term in brackets on the left hand side is unambiguously positive since x0(~ ¾) < 0. The ¯rst
term on the right hand side is negative whereas the two last terms are positive. The economic
interpretation of these signs is quite intuitive. If the productivity in the skilled position decreases
sharply with ¾ (so 1=x0(¾) is low), ¯rms are incited to postpone renovation (
@TR(h)
@g > 0), since
the potential gain of implementing a new technology is lower. On the other hand, if the decrease
in the productivity of skilled positions is not very sensitive to the rise in ¾, ¯rms renovate faster
when growth accelerates (
@TR(h)
@g < 0). ¥
An acceleration in the growth rate fosters unambiguously a rise in the share of trained workers.
In contrast, the pace of updating may increase or decrease depending on the relationship between
18the productivity of skilled positions and the ability of the workers becoming skilled, measured
by the training e®ort ¾. Note that in periods of high turbulence (high growth, g, associated
with a high depreciation of human capital, such that ± < ¼) the impact of growth on the share
of unskilled getting trained may be ambiguous.
4.2.3 The capitalization vs. the creative-destruction e®ect
It is in the interest of the ¯rm to renovate if and only if the renovation cost is lower than the
optimal value it obtains without renovation. In this case, the optimal updating time TR is
shorter than the optimal scrapping time T (see the appendix A for the derivation of T):
I(h;¾) · J¤(h;¾) , TR(h) < T(h) for a skilled worker
I(h;¾) · J¤(h;¾) , TR(hn) < T(hn) for an unskilled worker not getting trained
I(h;¾) · J¤(h;¾) , TR(h) < T(h) for an unskilled worker getting trained
Updating a technology associated with a job is a necessary but not a su±cient condition for the
capitalization e®ect to dominate over the creative destruction one. Even if it is in the interest
of the ¯rm to update a job rather than destroying it, this does not mean that the expected
net pro¯ts increase when growth accelerates. Actually, even if it is in the interest of the ¯rm
to renovate, the labor cost e®ect induced by the rise in wages may overcome the actualization
e®ect coming from the rise in productivity associated to updating. In this case, the pro¯ts of
the ¯rm, net of renovation costs, may fall when growth accelerates, leading to a reduction in the
number of open vacancies.
For the skilled segment we assume that I(h;¾) ! 0, which implies that TR(h) ! 0. Renovation
is then the preferred option (TR(h) < T(h)) and the capitalization e®ect is always dominant
when growth accelerates (
@J(h;¾)
@g > 0).
Proposition 5 For each (h;¾) there exists a unique implementation cost I¤(h;¾) >
0, such that @J(h;¾)=@g > 0 for all I(h;¾) < I¤(h;¾) and @J(h;¾)=@g < 0 for all
I(h;¾) > I¤(h;¾).
Proof See appendix. ¥
4.3 The labor market tightness
Replacing J(t;t;h;¾ > ~ ¾) = p(t)J(h;¾ > ~ ¾), J(t;t;h;¾ < ~ ¾) = p(t)J(h;¾ < ~ ¾) and J(t;t;h;¾ <




















J(h;¾ < ~ ¾)dG(¾) ´ J (39)
where we refer to this expression as the job creation rule. Whereas the optimal values associated
to each type of ¯lled vacancy are already known, the labor market tightness as well as the
number of unemployed workers remains unknown. Combining this job creation rule with the
equilibrium employment °ow equations will allow us to ¯nd both, the labor market tightness
and unemployment rates.
There is an externality induced by the undirected search process: when growth accelerates, the
number of unskilled workers getting trained increases, which rises the expected return of the
search process and stimulates the opening of new vacancies. Actually, the impact of a variation
of growth on the labor market tightness depends on its heterogenous impact on the job values.
If the capitalization e®ect is dominant in all jobs, then, a higher growth rate leads to more
employment. In contrast, if the creative-destruction e®ect dominates for at least one type of
job, the impact of growth on employment is ambiguous. The introduction of training allowing
unskilled workers to access high quality jobs (skilled jobs), allows to magnify the positive impact
of growth on employment: the highest ability workers can access to jobs where renovation costs
are equal to zero and so the capitalization e®ect dominates9.
4.4 The skilled and unskilled unemployment rates
Note ¯rst that, if it is optimal for ¯rms to renovate positions occupied by unskilled the only
source of job destruction will be the exogenous shock ±. In this case, exists from employment will
be given by ±E(h) + p(µ)u(h)e¡±TR(h)
, where E(h) and u(h) stand for the number of unskilled
employed and unemployed workers of ability ¾ < ~ ¾ and p(µ)u(h)e¡±TR(h)
represents the fraction
of job creation that survives to exogenous destruction and that is then renovated (becoming
skilled). Entries to employment are given by: p(µ)u(h). The equilibrium °ow equation is then
equal to:







(r + ± ¡ g)2 > 0
The impact of growth is larger when ¾ is low.
20Following the same reasoning we can establish the equilibrium °ow equation for skilled workers:
p(µ)u(h) + p(µ)u(h)e¡±TR(h)
= ±E(h) (41)
To keep the population of skilled and unskilled workers constant, the external out°ows and
in°ows from each population category must be equalized. More precisely, the number of skilled
workers su®ering a depreciation of their human capital must equal the number of unskilled
workers whose positions are renovated and then, their human capital improved:
p(µ)u(h)e¡±TR(h)
= ¼u(h): (42)
Finally, we normalize to one the total population associated to the ability level ¾ < ~ ¾ so that
we ¯nd P(h) + P(h) = 1, where P(h) = u(h) + E(h) and P(h) = u(h) + E(h) . We have thus
four equations and four unknowns for an ability level ¾ < ~ ¾: u(h), u(h), P(h), P(h).
Combining equations (41) and (42) yields (p(µ)+¼ +±)u(h) = ±P(h). Similarly, from equation
(40) we obtain: ±P(h) = u(h)(p(µ)(1 ¡ e¡±TR(h)
) + ±). We then have:
u(h) =
±P(h)
p(µ)(1 ¡ e¡±TR(h)) + ±
u(h) =
±P(h)
p(µ) + ¼ + ±
(43)
leading to the following unemployment rates:
u(h)=P(h) = uR(h) =
±
p(µ)(1 ¡ e¡±T R(h)) + ±
u(h)=P(h) = uR(h) =
±
p(µ) + ¼ + ±
(44)
If we want rather to compute the total population of skilled and unskilled workers as well as




p(µ)(1 ¡ e¡±T R(h)) + ±
=
±¼P(h)





p(µ)(1 ¡ e¡±T R(h)) + ±
=
±¼(1 ¡ P(h))













































When renovation is not optimal for the ¯rm there are two sources of job destruction, the
exogenous shock and the endogenous decision of the ¯rm. In the absence of renovation there
21is no incentive for the workers to get trained so there are no transitions from the unskilled
population towards the skilled population. Then, we suppose that there are no skilled in the
economy. In this case we only have labor °ows between the employment and the unemployment
situation and P(h) = 1. The unemployment rate is given by:
U(h)=P(h) = uR(h) =
±
± + p(µ)(1 ¡ e¡±TR(h))
(50)
5 Numerical simulations
The theoretical analysis shows that there is an equilibrium such that an acceleration in the
growth rate will certainly improve the employment rate of skilled workers, for whom the cap-
italization e®ect will always be dominant under the hypothesis that I(h;¾) ! 0. Results are
more ambiguous when analyzing unskilled workers. Three possible situations may arise:
² If I(h;¾) > J¤(h;¾j¾<~ ¾) > J¤(h;¾j¾>~ ¾), then renovation costs are higher than search cost
whatever the type of unskilled worker considered. It is never in the interest of the ¯rm to
renovate and the creative destruction e®ect is always dominant when growth accelerates.
² If J¤(h;¾j¾<~ ¾) > I(h;¾) > J¤(h;¾j¾>~ ¾), it is in the interest of the ¯rm to renovate
positions occupied by unskilled workers getting trained but not those occupied by unskilled
not getting trained. The capitalization e®ect may then dominate when growth accelerates
for workers getting trained whereas the creative destruction e®ect is dominant for those
not getting trained.
² If J¤(h;¾j¾<~ ¾) > J¤(h;¾j¾>~ ¾) > I(h;¾), it is in the interest of the ¯rm to renovate any
job occupied by an unskilled worker.
In this section, we propose numerical experiments in order to test the ability of the model to
reproduce the impact of growth on the employment rate estimated by Pissarides and Vallanti
(2007) on the basis of OCDE data. The paper tries to contribute in this way to the existing
discussion in the literature concerning the capacity of the matching model to explain the impact
of productivity changes on the employment rate10. Our claim is that by introducing the possi-
10See Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) for the long-run relationship between TFP growth and employment, or
Shimer (2005a), Hall (2005), Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Costain and
Reiter (2008) or Pissarides (2007) for the short-run relationship between productivity shocks and employment
°uctuations.
22bility of training, our model should be able to improve the performance of the matching models
in what concerns the relationship between employment and growth.
Table 1: Baseline Parameters Values
Job productivity x = x0 = 1
Productivity parameters ¹ = 2 ¶ = 1
Renovation parameters IUN = 4 IUF = 4
Interest rate r = .04
Matching elasticity ® = .5
Matching e±ciency m0 = 0:1
Recruiting cost c = .33
Exogenous separation rate ± = .032
Outside option b = .6
Probability of human capital depreciation ¼ = 0.6
The numerical values of the parameters of our benchmark simulation are summarized in Table
1. A matching function of the Cobb-Douglas form is assumed: M = m0u®v1¡®, where ® is the
elasticity with respect to unemployment and it is assumed to be equal to 0.5 (see Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001)). Concerning the exogenous destruction rate, we employ the estimations
provided by Gomez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti (2004) for France (typical European country
in terms of labor market functioning) for the period from 1992 to 2000. The estimated annual
job destruction rates linked to exits from the manufacturing sector are estimated to be equal
to 3.2%. We adopt this value. We set the outside option on the basis of the values estimated
by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), b = :6. The productivity in skilled positions is given by
x = x0 ¢ ¹ ¢ e¡¶¤¾ where x0 = 1, ¹ = 2 and ¶ = 1, so that the productivity in a skilled position is
inversely proportional to the training cost.
Human capital levels of unskilled and skilled workers are given by [h;h] ² [0:6;1]. We suppose a
continuum of training costs de¯ned between 0 and 1, i.e. ¾ ² [¾;¾] = ¾ ² [0;1]. The matching
e±ciency parameter, m0 = 0:1 and the renovation costs associated with each type of worker (i.e.
IUN and IUF) are set so as to reproduce the unemployment rate observed for a typical European
economy (an aggregate unemployment rate around 8% for a growth rate equal to 2%, where
unskilled not getting trained support an unemployment rate around 12% whereas skilled workers
23and unskilled getting trained support an unemployment rate around 7%) as well as the average
unemployment duration (around two years11). With this calibration, the share of workers being
skilled or unskilled getting trained increases by 9% as the growth rate evolves from 1% to 2%,
attaining almost 90% of the total population at g = 2%. Unskilled workers not getting trained
represent a progressively decreasing proportion of the population. An acceleration of growth
induces thus training of unskilled workers. Does this favor a decrease in the unemployment rate?
The answer is provided by table 2, where we display the variation (in percentage points) of the
unemployment rates associated to each workers' quali¯cation, when the growth rate increases
from 1 to 2%.
Table 2: The impact of growth on aggregate unemployment by quali¯cation
USK+UNT UNT USK UN UTOT
¢U if g " from 1% to 2% -1.3560 -1.1929 -0.1631 +1.8741 -1.0768
USK=Skilled unemployed; UNT=Unskilled getting trained unemployed; UN=Unskilled unemployed;
UTOT=Total unemploy
Table 2 reveals a key result: an increase of one percentage point in the growth rate (from 1% to
2%) decreases aggregate unemployment rate by 1.0768 percentage points, which corresponds well
to the estimations of Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) and which con¯rms that, at the aggregate
level, the capitalization e®ect is dominant. However, a detailed analysis by quali¯cation level
reveals that the relationship between unemployment and growth varies according not only to
the skill level of the worker but also to the training decision. Actually, whereas the correlation
between unemployment and growth arises as negative when considering skilled workers and
unskilled getting trained, it becomes positive as soon as we focus on unskilled workers not
getting trained. The smaller reduction in skilled unemployment with respect to unskilled is
explained by the lower starting level of skilled's unemployment rate.
Figure 1, allows us to better understand the capitalization and the creative destruction e®ects by
worker's skill and training decision. First of all, note that the aggregate labor market tightness
increases with the growth rate, implying a dominant capitalization e®ect. This yields a reduction
in the aggregate unemployment rate by around one percentage point. The unemployment rate
11Because there is a single labor market tension, we will have a single unemployment duration for all workers.
24of unskilled workers not getting training continuously increases as growth rises, underlining the
existence of a dominant creative destruction e®ect all along the growth path. Conversely, if the
attention is focused on the joint unemployment rate of skilled and unskilled getting trained,
we observe a continuously decreasing path. The capitalization e®ect is then dominant for this
worker category.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5destruction e®ect. Finally, when considering unskilled workers getting training, the renovation
horizon is below the scrapping horizon for each growth level, meaning that it is in the interest
of the ¯rm to update the technology when growth accelerates rather destroying the job.


























3 Unskilled workers getting trained
training cost
T
For unskilled workers getting trained: the starred lines stand for the scrapping horizon, which is the same for all
training cost levels and decreases with the growth rate. The dark lines stand for the renovation horizon, which
increases with the training cost (X-axis) and decreases with the growth rate. Note that the scale on the y-axis is
not linear but logarithmic.
Figure 2: Unskilled workers getting trained: scrapping horizon and renovation horizon.
In sum, the capitalization e®ect dominates for skilled workers and for unskilled workers get-
ting trained. In contrast, the creative destruction e®ect is dominant for unskilled not getting
trained. Because, the proportion of this last type of worker on the total population decreases as
growth accelerates, the relationship between growth and unemployment is negative. Actually,
an increase in one percentage point in the growth rate decreases aggregate unemployment by
26around one percentage point, which corresponds well to the aggregate capitalization e®ect es-
timated by Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) who ¯nd an elasticity of around 1 to 1.5 percentage
points. The introduction of training in a standard vintage model µ a la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998) allows a great improvement in its predicting ability of the relationship between growth
and unemployment.
5.1 Sensitivity tests
The introduction of training for low-skilled workers, allowing those having the best ability en-
dowment to become skilled in case of renovation, seems to solve the di±culties found by recent
literature to numerically reproduce the estimated positive impact of growth on the unemploy-
ment rate.
In this section, we brie°y show that, if instead of considering heterogeneous agents in terms of
abilities (i.e. skilled versus unskilled but also between unskilled getting trained and unskilled
not getting trained), we had considered homogeneous workers, our numerical simulations would
have found di±culties in reproducing empirical estimations. Most precisely, we consider two
possible scenarios: one where we assume that all workers have a human capital level equal to 0.6
(which stands for the human capital level of unskilled workers in our benchmark simulation),
and another scenario where all workers have h = 1 (which stands for the human capital level of
skilled workers).
The e±ciency of the matching process is set (m0 = 0:26) so as to reproduce an unemployment
rate around 7% for high-skilled (h = 1), around 12% for low-skilled (h = 0:6), an unemployment
duration of one year for high skilled and of two years and a half for unskilled, when g = 2%.
We leave all the other parameters at the same level as in the benchmark simulation. We now
compare what would have been the evolution of the unemployment rate in case of an acceleration
in the growth rate, if all agents were homogeneous in terms of human capital.
Table 3: The impact of growth on the unemployment rate
h = 0:6 h = 1
¢Unemployment rate 5.4696 4.1909
We realize that in both cases, the creative destruction e®ect is dominant, so that the unemploy-
ment rate increases by 5.5 percentage points when h = 0:6 and by 4.2 percentage points when
27h = 1. In sum, eliminating skill and training heterogeneity from our original set up, prevents
the model to numerically reproduce the estimated elasticity of unemployment with respect to
growth.
6 Conclusion
The impact of growth on the employment rate has often been claimed to be ambiguous. In-
deed, when growth accelerates, two contradictory e®ects arise. On the one hand, as Pissarides
(1990) claims, an acceleration of growth improves the employment rate, because growth increases
\freely" the expected pro¯ts and then provides incentives to open new jobs (the capitalization
e®ect). On the other hand, Aghion and Howitt (1994) argue that growth fosters a \creative
destruction" process inducing more job destruction and less job creation, yielding higher un-
employment rates (creative destruction e®ect). At the empirical level, it seems though to be a
common agreement on the fact that growth yields a reduction on the unemployment rates (see
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) or Tripier (2007)). However, when
calibrated, recent theoretical works, as Pissarides and Vallanti (2007) or Langot and Moreno-
Galbis (2008), do not manage to reproduce the estimated negative elasticity of unemployment
with respect to growth.
In this paper we show that, by introducing the possibility of training and human capital de-
preciation in a vintage framework a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), we greatly improve
the predicting ability of the model to reproduce the sensibility of employment with respect to
growth. The intuition behind this result is very simple: when growth accelerates, the opportu-
nity cost of the training investment for workers is lower, shifting the human capital distribution
to the right since more people get trained. This tends to increase the incentives of ¯rms to
update the job-speci¯c technology. Therefore training magni¯es the impact of growth on the
employment rate.
When calibrated, our theoretical framework predicts that an increase of one percentage point
in the growth rate reduces aggregate unemployment by more of one percentage point. This
reduction comes mainly from the fall in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers getting
trained and, in a minor measure, from the decrease in the skilled unemployment rate. Conversely,
unskilled workers not getting trained will su®er a rise in their unemployment rate as growth
accelerates.
28References
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt. 1994. \Growth and Unemployment." Review of Economic Studies
61 (3): 477{496.
Blanchard, O., and J. Wolfers. 2000. \The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence." The Economic Journal 110 (462):
1{33 (March).
Costain, J., and M. Reiter. 2008. \Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Cal-
ibration of Matching Models." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, forthcoming
32:1120{1155.
Gomez-Salvador, R., J. Messina, and G. Vallanti. 2004. \Gross job °ows and institutions in
Europe." Labour Economics 11 (4): 469{485 (August).
Hagedorn, M., and I. Manovskii. 2008. \The Cyclical Behaviour of Equilibrium Unemployment
and Vacancies revisited." American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Hall, R. 2005. \Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness." American
Economic Review 95 (1): 50{65 (March).
Langot, F., and E. Moreno-Galbis. 2008. \Does the growth process discriminate against older
workers?" GAINS Working Paper.
Ljunqvist, J., and T. Sargent. 2008. \Two questions about European Unemployment." Econo-
metrica 76:1{29.
Michaud, J.B. 2007. \Creative destruction with on the job e®ect." CEP Discussion Paper,
no. 835.
Mortensen, D., and E. Nagypal. 2007. \More on Unemployment and Vacancy Fluctuations."
Review of Economic Dynamics 10 (3): 327{347.
Mortensen, D., and C. Pissarides. 1998. \Technological Progress, Job Creation and Job
Destruction." Review of Economic Dynamics 1:733{753.
Petrongolo, B., and C. Pissarides. 2001. \Looking Back into the Black Box: a Survey of the
Matching Function." Journal of Economic Literature 39:390{431.
Pissarides, C. 1990. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Edited by MIT Press. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
29. 2007. \The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the Answer?" Mimeo.
Pissarides, C., and G. Vallanti. 2007. \The impact of TFP growth on steady-state unemploy-
ment." International Economic Review 48 (May): 607{640.
Shimer, R. 2005a. \The Dyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies."
American Economic Review 95 (1): 25{49 (March).
. 2005b. \On-the-Job Search and Strategic Bargaining." European Economic Review
50 (4): 811{830.
Tripier, F. 2007. \The long run relationship between growth and unemployment. A transatlantic
perspective." Mimeo.
A The optimal scrapping time
When the updating cost is extremely high, it will not be in the interest of the ¯rm to update
the technology since it will be more pro¯table to directly o®er a new vacancy. In this case,
unskilled workers have no incentive to get trained while employed, since their position will
never be updated. There will then be one scrapping time associated with skilled positions and












Maximizing J(¿;t;h;¾) with respect to Th yields the following FOC:
bh ¡ ¼
bh ¡ bh




The higher the probability of human capital depreciation, the lower will be the wage asked by
skilled workers and, therefore, the optimal destruction horizon increases. Actually, everything
that tends to reduce the wage earned by skilled workers will induce a rise in the optimal scrapping
time (this will also increase the probability that the job gets renovated). Similarly, a productivity
improvement tends to increase the optimal destruction horizon.
Once Th is determined from (51), we can replace it in the asset value function of the ¯rm leading
to J¤(h;¾) =
R Th
0 e¡(r+±)s[x(¾)h(1¡eg(s¡Th))]ds. The optimal asset value function is increasing
30in the worker's productivity and the optimal scrapping horizon, whereas it decreases with the
growth rate.





and it is increasing with the worker's productivity and decreasing with the growth rate and
the worker's wage. Replacing in J(h;¾) yields: J¤(h;¾) =
R Thn
0 e¡(r+±)s[xh(1 ¡ eg(s¡Thn
))].
This optimal value is again increasing in the worker's productivity and in the optimal scrapping
horizon, while it decreases with the growth rate.
In sum, in this framework we have two scrapping times (one for skilled and another one for un-
skilled) and three renovation horizons (one for skilled, another one for unskilled getting trained
and another one for unskilled not getting trained). A job occupied by a skilled worker is reno-
vated rather than destroyed if the associated renovation horizon is below the scrapping horizon.
Similarly, if the implementation horizon of a job occupied by an unskilled worker getting trained
or by an unskilled not getting trained is below the scrapping horizon associated to unskilled
positions, the job is renovated rather than destroyed. Since TR(hn) > TR(h) we might ¯nd a
situation where it is in the interest of the ¯rm to renovate only positions occupied by unskilled
workers getting trained, i.e.TR(hn) > Th > TR(h).
B Proof of the proposition 5








(r + ± ¡ g)egTR(h) ]
=
xh ¡ w(h;¾)
r + ± ¡ g
(53)
which is increasing in g (
@J(h;¾)
@g > 0).
12Note that in the absence of renovation unskilled workers have no incentive to train since they know that they
will never become skilled. Because no one gets trained, all unskilled workers are homogeneous.
31Then, it is su±cient to prove that
@2J(h;¾)
@g@I(h;¾) < 0 in order to have a critical I¤(h;¾) from






< 0 if (r + ± ¡ g) > 0
(54)





(¡TR(h) + (r + ± ¡ g)@TR(h)
@g )













@g > 0 when I(h;¾) ! 0 and
@2J(h;¾)
@I@g < 0 for all I(h;¾), there exists a unique










Figure 3: The capitalization vs. the creative destruction e®ect.
² For unskilled workers getting trained we follow a similar procedure. Replacing equation

















(r + ± ¡ g)egTR(h) ] + J(h;¾) ¡ I(h;¾)
32Computing the limit of the previous expression when (I(h;¾);TR(h)) ! (0;0) yields:
lim
(I(h;¾);TR(h))!(0;0)
J(h;¾) = J(h;¾) + xh ¤ 0 = J(h;¾) =
xh ¡ w(h;¾)
r + ± ¡ g
which is increasing in g (
@J(h;¾)
@g > 0 for ¾ < ~ ¾). Again, it will be then su±cient to
prove that
@2J(h;¾)
@g@I(h;¾) < 0 for ¾ < ~ ¾, in order to have a critical I¤(h;¾) from which the
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